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ABSTRACT 
Network connectivity has always been under the sovereignty of airlines until a few years ago 
when a small number of airports embarked on challenging that legacy and introduced the first so-
called airport-led transfer schemes. Although the viability and future of airport-led transfer 
schemes that entail an airport-airline-co-operation is heavily dependent on airline participation, 
their role and what could promote or impede their adoption decision is generally absent from 
academic literature. Therefore, this paper analyses the potential drivers and barriers for the airline 
adoption of airport facilitated inter-airline network connectivity schemes. In order to achieve this, 
a case study research strategy was employed and the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative 
data was attained through a combination of literature, interview and survey research that was 
guided by the innovation diffusion theory. Findings suggest a total of 23 key drivers and barriers 
that directly and indirectly influence the airline adoption of airport facilitated inter-airline network 
connectivity schemes. Beyond those individual drivers and barriers, three main research findings 
of strategic relevance for the future diffusion and airline adoption of such schemes can be 
identified: Limited awareness, divergent attitudes and the schemes obsolescence risk. 
Keywords: Aviation; Self-connectivity; interline; codeshare; connectivity; airline; airport; innovation 
diffusion theory 
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The world’s air transport industry has seen tremendous change in the post-deregulation 
era (Oum & Park, 1997) but it was primarily the advent of the Low-Cost Carrier (LCC) 
business model (Ito & Lee, 2003) and the emergence of the hub-and-spoke networks 
(Burghouwt, 2007) that shaped the dynamic and hyper-competitive airline industry 
landscape.  
Designing powerful hub-and-spoke networks enabled airlines not only to build 
the so-called ‘Network Fortresses’ (Tretheway & Waters, 1998), it simultaneously made 
airline partnerships more attractive as the spatial and temporal concentration of flights 
enabled efficient connectivity among the partners (Pels, 2001). This first manifested in 
strategic interline partnerships (Philips, 1987) and culminates today in multilateral and 
globe-spanning alliances and joint ventures (Seabury, 2015).  
On the contrary, the emerging archetypical LCC business model was based on a 
strict Point-to-Point (P2P) regime without any network connectivity, not online and most 
certainly not interline with partners (Fageda et al., 2015). Through the unprecedented 
growth of these new breed of carriers, the amount and size of non-connected airline 
networks grew exponentially and some passengers began to self-connect those networks 
by purchasing separate tickets and handling the transfer themselves (Suau-Sanchez et al., 
2017).   
Almost 40 years after the airline deregulation first took off in the  
US (Doganis, 2010), these two key industry developments seem to converge as LCCs 
begin to signal their interest in network connectivity (de Wit & Zuidberg, 2012) and 
airline partnerships (Morandi, et al., 2015). A noteworthy development in that respect is 
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the emergence of so-called airport-led transfer schemes (Maertens et al., 2016a) which 
do have the potential to alter the airline industries’ approach towards network 
connectivity and airline partnerships.  
It was in the mid-2000s, when the first airports with a high volume of LCC traffic 
realised the potential of the non-connected airline networks at their doorstep and 
implemented innovative transfer schemes intending to facilitate the passengers’ self-
connection (Maertens et al., 2016a). The very first two airport-led transfer schemes, 
‘viaberlin’ and ‘Cologne Bonn Connect’, lasted only a few years. However, shortly after 
their discontinuance the current schemes at Milan-Malpensa (2011), Singapore (2012), 
London-Gatwick (2013) and London-Stansted (2018) were launched. While all four 
schemes share similar characteristics, they differ in one key aspect: airline participation. 
While ‘ViaMilano’ for instance operates independently from the airlines, 
‘GatwickConnects’ entails an airport-airline-co-operation (Fichert & Klophaus, 2016). 
Figure 1 shows the different types of airport-led transfer schemes and where this paper 
fits in terms of scope.  
In 2017, easyJet announced their ‘Worldwide by easyJet’ platform which can be 
described as the next leap in the passenger self-connectivity evolution driven this time by 
an airline. The platform can be best described as a digital virtual hub that enables self-
connect and sales partnerships between easyJet and its participating carriers. EasyJet 
initially based their platform on the already developed self-connect itinerary 
identification technology of Dohop and the existing self-connect infrastructure of 
GatwickConnects (easyJet, 2017).  
It was also in the mid-2000s, when the topic of self-connectivity and airport-led 
transfer schemes received first notable academic interest (e.g. Burghouwt, 2007; Grimme, 
2008; Malighetti et al., 2008), although today the relevant literature is still sparse (Suau-
Sanchez et al., 2016; Zeigler et al., 2017; Cattenao, 2017; Cserep, 2017) and mainly 
revolves around the potential and what implications it has for the airports. The potential 
implications for airlines have received very limited attention, which is somewhat 
surprising as network connectivity has always been under the sovereignty of the airlines 
and airport-led transfer schemes, at least to some extent, try to challenge that status quo. 
 
 
Figure 1. Types of airport-led transfer schemes and research scope. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Although airport-led transfer schemes have been around for more than 10 years 
now, the concept is still innovative and only at the onset of its potential diffusion. In this 
regard, an innovation can add value to an airline if it either solves a major problem or 
creates a competitive advantage (Franke, 2007), both of which airport-led transfer 
schemes could potentially achieve with respect to online and interline network 
connectivity. The benefits an airline could potentially generate by adopting such schemes 
are somewhat similar to the benefits associated with traditional airline partnerships, for 
instance access to additional feed or an extended network reach (Bissessur & Alamdari, 
1998). Consequently, it can be argued that airport-led transfer schemes could challenge 
the legacy partnership mechanisms of interlining and codesharing, especially as they offer 
a solution to those carriers that do not connect today because of technological limitations 
or business model implications. 
Hence, against this background, the focus of this paper is on interline network 
connectivity and in particular on how airport led-transfer schemes can act as an innovative 
partnership mechanism for airlines that do not connect today. As a consequence, and to 
stress our research focus, we introduce the term ‘airport facilitated inter-airline network 
connectivity schemes’ (AFINCSs) and use this instead of the more generic term ‘airport-
led transfer schemes’ where applicable.   
While much has been written about traditional airline partnerships (e.g. Ginieis et 
al., 2012), little is known about what could actually promote or impede the airlines’ 
adoption of airport-led transfer schemes to establish interline network connectivity. 
Beyond the overarching motivation to attract incremental passengers (Maertens et al., 
2016a), only a few positive and negative aspects are sparingly mentioned in the academic 
literature, while a holistic understanding of potential drivers and barriers is clearly non-
existent. This is an obvious gap in the academic literature that requires further 
investigation as the viability and future of airport-led transfer schemes that entail an 
airport-airline-co-operation is heavily dependent on the airlines’ participation. Thus, the 
aim is of this paper is to unveil, rank and assess the perceived drivers and barriers 
impacting the airline adoption of AFINCSs. In order to fulfil this aim we employ a mixed-
method approach. Firstly, we identify the drivers and barriers from the existing relevant 
literature as well as expert interviews. Secondly, we use a survey to collect intelligence 
on how industry professionals perceive the previously identified drivers and barriers. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we review the 
literature on airline partnerships as well as the perspective of passengers, airports and 
airlines on airport-led transfer schemes. Section 3 presents the methods and the analytical 
framework we use for the analysis in order to reach our research objective. Section 4 then 
presents the results and Section 5 our conclusions.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND STATE OF THE ART 
 
2.1. Airline partnerships and legacy mechanisms 
 
Airline partnerships are for many airlines a key element of their strategy. Airlines 
cooperate because many customers demand a ‘from anywhere to anywhere service’ 
which is impossible for one airline to supply efficiently (IATA, 2012). Although the 
scope of, and reasoning for, cooperation in the early days of commercial aviation was 
different (Hall & Eppink, 1992), in fact many bilateral air services agreements essentially 
forced the airlines to cooperate (Doganis, 1991), it can be argued that cooperation has 
always been a central element in air transport networks (Bissessur & Alamdari, 1998). 
Modern forms of airline partnerships emerged in the early 1990s (Bilotkach & 
Hüschelrath, 2010) and have evolved from rather simple agreements to complex and 
globe-spanning, multilateral partnerships (Doganis, 2010). At the heart of modern airline 
partnerships lies the motivation to connect to complementary partner networks to gain 
traffic feed and access to new markets (Burton & Hanlon, 1994).     
The emergence, growth and evolution of airline partnerships has attracted significant 
interest (Ginieis et al., 2012) which manifests in a vast amount of theoretical and 
empirical research covering the various facets of airline partnerships. Table 1 provides a 
non-exhaustive overview of perceived key research streams. 
Table 1. Airline partnership research streams 
Research streams Selected publications 
Reasons for partnership Bennet (1997); Burton & Hanlon (1994); Evans (2001); 
Iatrou & Oretti (2007) and Oum & Park (1997). 
Partnership models Fan et al. (2001); Gudmundsson & Rhoades (2001); 
Henneman & Malanik (2010) and Tretheway & Oum (1992) 
Airline benefits Hannegan & Mulvey (1995); Iatrou & Alamdari (2005); 
Min & Joo (2016); Morrish & Hamilton (2002); Oum et al. 
(2000) and Zou & Chen (2017) 
Consumer benefits Bilotkach (2005); Brueckner (2003); Goh & Uncles (2003); 
Park (1997) and Weber (2005) 
Regulatory and anti-trust immunity Bilotkach & Hüschelrath (2012); Oum et al. (2001) and 
Whalen (2007) 
Network and connectivity Bissessur & Alamdari (1998); Dennis (2000) and Hsu & 
Shih (2008) 
Revenue management Belobaba & Jain (2013); Vinod (2005) 
Brand Chung & Feng (2016); He & Balmer (2006) and 
Kalligiannis et al. (2006) 
Low-cost carriers and partnerships Fichert & Klophaus (2016); Kawamori & Lin (2011) and 
Morandi et al. (2015) 
Miscellaneous Airline Service Quality: Tiernan et al. (2008) – Airport 
Terminal Co-location:  Wu & Lee (2014) – Frequent Flyer 
Programmes: Gudmundsson et al. (2002) – Impact on firm 
value: Wassmer & Meschi (2011) 
 
Airlines, like any other commercial entity, have to make strategic choices across 
three different dimensions: the business strategy, the strategic directions and the strategy 
methods (Johnson et al., 2011). The latter dimension focuses on whether a company or 
airline pursues its strategy organically, through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or by 
entering into strategic alliances. Whilst organic development can be considered as the 
default method to pursue a strategy, M&As are at the other end of the spectrum and 
requires taking ownership of another company or combining two independent companies. 
Strategic alliances lie somewhere in between those two methods and Oum et al. (2000, p. 
5) describe a strategic alliance in the airline environment “as being a long-term 
partnership of two or more firms who attempt to enhance competitive advantages 
collectively vis-à-vis their competitors by sharing scarce resources including brand assets 
and market access capability, enhancing service quality, and thereby, improving 
profitability”.  
 There are several external and internal drivers for cooperation. From an external 
point of view the patchy regulatory environment and the restrictive air service agreements 
create challenges for cross-border M&As (Walulik, 2016). Since at the same time no 
individual carrier is able to satisfy the constantly growing demand for global air 
transportation airline partnerships are inevitable (Oum et al., 2000). The information 
revolution also impacted the airline industry on several grounds but the emergence of 
sophisticated Global Distributions Systems (GDSs) in the late 1970s (Humphreys, 1994) 
not only created strong distribution channels, it also made partnerships, in particular 
codeshare partnerships, an effective and attractive option for market entry (Evans, 2001).  
There are also various generic internal reasons to cooperate: to achieve economies 
of scale, scope and learning; to gain access to other firms’ assets, resources and 
competences; to reduce and mitigate risks through sharing; to shape competition; and to 
reach the market faster (Bennet, 1997; Evans, 2001). Beyond those generic reasons there 
are other specific internal motivations for cooperation between airlines: to enable or 
increase the interline passenger feed; extend the network reach; create a seamless travel 
experience; increase the marketability of interline itineraries through codesharing; 
improve frequent flyer programmes, mutually operate services, share facilities and jointly 
purchase supplies; and collectively schedule flights and influence pricing (Burton & 
Hanlon, 1994; Bissessur & Alamdari, 1998; Iatrou & Oretti, 2007; Bilotkach & 
Hüschelrath, 2012). 
 Although there are many good reasons to cooperate, it must not be ignored that 
implementing partnerships can be costly. According to Fageda et al. (2015) connecting 
passengers entails a series of consequences that have ramifications across the airline 
business competitiveness. In the context of airline partnerships, it must be acknowledged 
that complexity, risks and costs arise from negotiating, implementing, and coordinating 
the partnership. Figure 2 presents the complexity of the partnership implementation chain. 
This in fact is one of the key reasons why many LCCs have refrained from partnering, 
although it appears that lately this has started to change (Morandi et al., 2015). 
  
 
Figure 2. The complexity of the partnership implementation chain. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The basic form of airline partnerships are interline cooperation’s. This partnership 
mechanism has been an essential element of international aviation since the 1950s 
(Fichert, 2013) and allows passengers to purchase a single ticket, in a single transaction, 
in one currency and a single contract for a journey that requires connecting at an 
intermediate point between the two cooperating carriers (IATA, 2004). The next iteration 
of airline cooperation is codesharing which became popular in the US following the air 
transport market deregulation in 1978 and emerged as standard practice for partnership 
around the globe (Steer Davies Gleave, 2007). The codeshare mechanism can be seen as 
extension to the interline mechanism whereby the carrier operating a given flight allows 
other airlines to market this flight and issue tickets for it as if they were operating the 
flight themselves (Morandi et al., 2015). Finally, largely build upon the usual interlining 
and codeshare mechanisms, global airline alliances and joint ventures represent advanced 
strategic alliances in which interline and codeshare components are still present 
(Competition Commission of Singapore, 2016). 
 
2.2 Airports challenging the legacy 
One of the key developments that has shaped the airline industry over the last decades is 
the emergence and inexorable growth of LCCs (de Wit & Zuidberg, 2012). This industry 
evolution led to an increasing number of non-connected airline networks as the 
archetypical LCC business model does not encompass network connectivity, neither 
interline nor online (Morandi et al., 2015). Since the large coverage of LCC networks 
provide opportunities to connect (Malighetti, 2008) some passengers started building 
their own itineraries by combining multiple tickets and taking care of their own baggage 
transfer (Suau-Sanchez et al., 2017). 
The phenomenon of passenger self-connectivity was first defined in the academic 
literature as ‘self-help hubbing’ (Burghouwt, 2007) or just ‘self-hubbing’ (Groß & 
Schröder, 2007) and Malighetti (2008) provided first insights about the potential for self-
help hubbing in the European market. Prior to that, four airports in Germany, namely 
Cologne-Bonn (2006) and the three airports of Berlin (2007) launched airport led-transfer 
schemes which were then shortly thereafter addressed from an academic perspective by 
Grimme (2008). Passengers continued to self-connect, the LCC and Full Service Network 
Carrier (FSNC) business models converged (Daft & Albers, 2015; Fageda et al., 2015), 
and new airport-led transfer schemes in Milan-Malpensa (2011), Singapore (2012) 
London-Gatwick (2013) and London-Stansted (2018) emerged thanks to the ongoing 
technological advancements (Cserep, 2016) including the arrival of new online travel 
providers identifying and facilitating the sale of self-connecting itineraries (Grimme et 
al., 2016). Some more recent contributions analyse the potential for self-connectivity in 
different markets (Suau-Sanchez et al., 2016, 2017; Maertens et al., 2016a) and the 
evolution of airline business models and schemes for assisting self-connecting 
passengers (Fichert & Klophaus, 2016). 
 Airport-led transfer schemes are the airports’ response to the potential that non-
connected LCC networks offer which, until their inception, were already being self-
connected by passengers and promoted by travel providers (Figure 3). While airport-led 
transfer schemes represent a win-win-win situation in which passengers, airlines and 
airports benefit, the existing schemes differ in their setup and strategy (Figure 4). One 
key difference among them is whether the airport operates the scheme autonomously 
without the airlines (e.g. ViaMilano) or if they entail an airport-airline-co-operation to 
facilitate the passenger self-connection as it is the case for GatwickConnects. In the case 
of GatwickConnects, the adopting airline is required to provide the airport access to their 
check-in system while granting the airport’s booking website direct access into the 
airline’s reservations system is optional. 
 
 
Figure 3. The evolutionary path of passenger self-connectivity. 




Figure 4. Airport-led transfer schemes at a glance. 
Source: Fichert & Klophaus (2016); Grimme (2008); Grimme (2011); www.berlin-airport.de; 
www.cologne-bonn-connect.com (archived); www.flyscoot.com; www.flyviamilano.eu; 
www.gatwickairport.com; www.koeln-bonn-airport.de; www.tigerairways.com; www.viaberlin.com 
(archived). 
 
2.2.1 The passengers’ perspective 
Theoretically, all passengers are presented with the option to self-connect, but this 
opportunity is primarily utilised by price sensitive travellers willing to trade time, 
convenience and airline responsibility, in case of misconnections, for lower airfares 
(Suau-Sanchez et al. 2016). The availability of airport-led transfer schemes means that a 
‘Do It Yourself’ (DIY) self-connection can be converted into an airport facilitated self-
connection which should have a higher attractiveness for the passenger. The utility for 
the passenger should increase primarily due to: a) providing access to an internet-based 
booking platform to identify and purchase connect-itineraries on non-connected airline 
networks (Fichert & Klophaus, 2016) with one booking transaction (GatwickConnects, 
2016); b) offering a transfer experience that reduces inconvenience by giving access to 
check-in and bag-drop facilities located airside close to the baggage claim area (Fichert 
& Klophaus, 2016; GatwickConnects, 2016); c) providing assistance and/or 
compensations in case of schedule changes prior to departure or in case of misconnections 
during the journey (Fichert & Klophaus, 2016; GatwickConnects, 2016); d) allowing 
usage of the fast-track security lane to re-enter airside (GatwickConnects, 2016); e) 
offering additional soft-benefits such as discount vouchers for duty free shopping, meals 
or lounge access (Fichert & Klophaus, 2016; GatwickConnects, 2016). 
Although airport-led transfer scheme connections should have a higher utility for 
the passenger versus DIY self-connecting, certain characteristics and limitations 
potentially constrain the utility. The utility for the passenger might not be fully realised 
primarily due to: a) the need to be aware of the concept and the distribution channels that 
identify and sell airport facilitated self-connection itineraries (Maertens et al., 2016a; 
Suau-Sanchez et al., 2016); b) non-competitive ticket fares as the sum-of-sectors fare plus 
the airport connection fee might not be competitive vis-à-vis traditional ticket fares for 
instance due to double-marginalisation or double-charging of fees and taxes (Fichert & 
Klophaus, 2016); c) the need to clear through customs and immigrations (depending on 
the actual passenger journey) which not only creates inconvenience but also requires valid 
travel documents (Fichert & Klophaus, 2016); d) the fact that the airport provided transfer 
services are not able to mimic all service functions that an airline offers, for instance visa 
checks or booking amendments (GatwickConnects, 2015); e) some services are only 
available during normal business hours (06:00 to 18:00 in case of the manned 
GatwickConnects desks) (GatwickConnects, 2016). 
Of the constraining factors presented above, the potential non-competitiveness of 
ticket fares is a salient issue because, although limited knowledge about the 
characteristics of self-connecting passengers exists (Suau-Sanchez et al., 2016), it is 
rather obvious that the majority of passengers would consider self-connecting only if it 
means lower ticket fares. In this regard, a study by OAG (2016) suggests that 40% of all 
passengers would consider self-connecting if they saved at least $100. Another critical 
constraining factor is the mentioned lack of passenger awareness of airport-led transfer 
schemes. The limited marketability of itineraries involving an airport facilitated self-
connection is another constraining factor since tickets cannot be purchased via traditional 
sales channels such as the airlines’ websites or through an online or offline travel agent 
using a GDS (Suau-Sanchez et al., 2016; Cserep, 2016).1 
 
2.2.2 The airports’ perspective 
Any revenue benefits for airports offering airport-led transfer schemes primarily arises 
from attracting incremental transfer passengers which in turn should increase aviation 
and non-aviation revenues (Malighetti et al., 2008). The aforementioned is valid for both 
traditional airports hosting an airline hub an airports home of a low-cost base. Indeed, 
Suau-Sanchez et al. (2016) highlight that the largest levels of potential self-connectivity 
are for airports with the highest levels of traditional connectivity such as Heathrow or 
Frankfurt. Other airports were more potential self-connectivity is observed are airports 
with large low-cost bases, like Barcelona, Gatwick or Manchester. Fageda et al. (2015) 
argue that these airports should consider facilitating passenger self-connections to 
                                                 
1 In the case of GatwickConnects at least two meta-search engines (skyscanner.com & dohop.com) have 
the ability to identify itineraries involving non-connected airline networks via LGW and inform the 
passenger at the time of booking about the existence of the scheme. In case of booking, the passenger gets 
transferred to the airport’s booking website where then two tickets including the GatwickConnects+ service 
can be purchased in one booking transaction but three financial transactions (GatwickConnects, 2016). 
increase the airports' competitive position, for instance when it comes to route 
development or attracting new airlines.  
What must not be forgotten is that the theoretical expected benefits do not come 
for free as the airport must plan, implement, promote and operate the respective transfer 
products and services. The associated costs must be covered through incremental 
revenues, by charging a passenger usage fee or by a combination of the two (Maertens et 
al., 2016a). 
 
2.2.3 The airlines’ perspective 
Airlines are waking up to the potential of self-connectivity and airport-led transfer 
schemes (Harrison, 2015; Gunnarsson, 2016). In this regard the literature concludes that 
the overarching motivation for airlines to adopt such schemes is attracting additional 
transfer passengers (Maertens et al., 2016a), which then creates financial benefits for the 
airlines linked to economies of density (Fageda et al., 2015). Maertens et al. (2016a) 
further argue that airport-led transfer schemes can generate those transfer passengers with 
very limited or without any additional production costs.  
Additional transfer passengers might either come from the airlines own network, 
if online connectivity is not offered already, or from other airlines participating in the 
scheme. Due to the latter, airport-led transfer schemes have the potential to generate 
benefits usually associated with partnerships realized through legacy mechanisms. These 
benefits include access to additional feed, an extended network reach, a better 
marketability of the non-connected airline networks and a more seamless transfer 
experience for the passenger. Therefore, airport-led transfer schemes can be considered 
as an innovative partnership mechanism that challenges, to some extent, the legacy of 
interline and codesharing. 
Nevertheless, there are some caveats and airlines might show resistance to 
participate in such an airport-led transfer schemes. While LCCs could consider 
participating in such schemes as a deviation from their original business model, FSNCs 
might not see a substantial benefit in carrying a few more passengers or even fear 
cannibalizing their own network. Issues related to brand and service homogeneity could 
also prevent FSNCs from participating in such schemes. 
Hence, our literature review indicates that the topic of airport-led transfer schemes 
is not yet widely addressed, with only a limited amount of publications that primarily 
focus on the potential of self-connectivity and its implications for the airports. The role 
of the airlines is only superficially addressed and little understanding seems to exist about 
why airlines could, or could not be interested in adopting airport-led transfer schemes. 
This paper aims at contributing to the closure of the gap by implementing empirical 
research that focuses on unveiling, ranking and assessing perceived drivers and barriers 
for the airline adoption of airport-led transfer schemes as a mechanism to establish inter-





We use a mixed-method research approach utilising academic and non-academic 
literature, qualitative interviews as well as a quantitative questionnaire. As the 
quantitative questionnaire constituted the most significant data collection instrument, the 
chosen research approach could also be described as a survey within a case study strategy 
(Yin, 2014). A single case study design has been selected focusing on GatwickConnects, 
as this scheme was considered the most successful airport-led transfer scheme to date. 
 Firstly, we identify the drivers and barriers from the relevant literature employing 
a systematic review. This review results in an extensive list of potential drivers and 
barriers that are explicitly and implicitly mentioned in the relevant literature. Given the 
limited amount of relevant literature, selected stakeholders were interviewed with the aim 
to unveil additional drivers and barriers. Interview participants were chosen through 
purposive sampling by the authors aiming for a heterogeneous group of stakeholders 
directly and indirectly involved in or exposed to airport-led transfer schemes. The 
motivation for selecting participants across the different stakeholder groups, and not just 
within the airlines, was based on the objective to capture potential drivers and barriers for 
airline adoption as perceived by different key stakeholders. In total, nine interview 
respondents were identified, who came from different sectors in the aviation industry and 
had been involved in airport-led transfer schemes (Table 2). Interviews were conducted 
in February 2017, five of which were telephone interviews and four were face-to-face. 
Anonymity was granted to safeguard personal privacy at the beginning of the interviews, 
which lasted between thirty minutes and one hour. 
 
Table 2. List of interview participants. 
# Sector Job title 
1 Airline Consultancy Head of Aviation Practice 
2 Airline Consultancy Partner 
3 Airline Consultancy Principal 
4 Airline Technology Provider General Manager 
5 Airport Operator Business Development Manager 
6 Global Airline Alliance Director Membership Development 
7 Global Airline Alliance Director Strategy 
8 Online Travel Provider Chief Executive Officer 
9 Passenger Airline Airport Station Manager 
 
 Secondly, once the drivers and barriers are identified, a survey is used to collect 
quantitative data about how airline industry professionals with experience in airline 
partnerships perceive those previously identified drivers and barriers. A self-administered 
online questionnaire using the Qualtrics Survey Platform was developed largely based on 
the data and intelligence gained during the qualitative research phase. The 
GatwickConnects scheme was used as blue-print to outline the airport-led transfer scheme 
concept in the introductory section without disclosing the actual airport operator to the 
participants. 
 The majority of the questions in the questionnaire were closed-ended rating 
questions aimed at capturing opinion variables through a five-point Likert scale. The 
labelling of the rating scale followed Saunders et al. (2009) recommendations. The most 
relevant questions, those regarding the potential drivers and barriers, were mostly 
presented to the survey participants in three matrices, one for potential drivers and two 
for potential barriers. The decision to employ matrices was made as they warranted a 
convenient and comprehensible presentation of the various drivers and barriers in the 
questionnaire. The decision for utilising matrices, however, was only made after critically 
reviewing comments from Dillman et al. (2014) that caution the usage of matrices but 
also provide best practices to simplify and optimise matrix questions. These guidelines 
were utilised as we ultimately considered matrices to be the most appropriate format for 
the questions asked. 
In addition to any closed-ended questions, several open-ended questions were 
added to enable the respondents to contribute additional drivers and barriers or to leave 
comments for specific topics of interest. All open-ended questions were optional to 
answer while all other questions were mandatory to complete.  
Questions were formulated ensuring clear wording and, as suggested by Krosnick 
& Presser (2010), the ‘Question Understanding Aid’ tool (QUAID) was utilised to 
identify and if possible alter problematic questions with respect to unfamiliar technical 
terms, vague or imprecise relative terms, vague or ambiguous noun-phrases, complex 
syntax and working memory overload. As using some airline partnership terms could not 
be avoided, several jargon words were further explained to the respondents if they 
hovered their mouse-cursor over  various underlined words in the questionnaire. The final 
flow of the questionnaire including question blocks and the respective amount of 
questions is presented in Figure 5. 
The selection of survey participants aimed at a more homogeneous group where 
all respondents had to have professional experience in airline partnerships. In total, 71 
potential participants were invited via electronic correspondence. Participants were also 
asked to nominate other potential respondents that could contribute and thus the sampling 
included a snowball component. The survey was open from 13 March 2017 to 7 April 
2017. A total of 47 questionnaires were completed (response rate of 66%). The 
respondents were from airlines, mainly from FSNCs, but also from Charter, LCCs, and 
Regionals 2 , aviation consultancy firms, airline alliances, airports and other aviation 
industry sectors (Figures 6 and 7). 
The data gathered through the survey research was analysed utilising univariate 
descriptive statistics focusing on the mean and the standard deviation to identify the 
significance of each drivers and barrier (mean), rank them by significance relative to one 
another (mean ranking) and to measure the agreement amongst the survey participants 
(standard deviation). For this research, any drivers and barriers with a mean score (MS) 
of ≥ 3.8 was considered a key driver or barrier.  
 
 
Figure 5. Survey structure. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
                                                 
2 While the overrepresentation of FSNCs respondents does not have a negative effect on the survey results, 
it must be kept in mind when analysing and interpreting the results. 
1. Welcome & Data Protection Note
2. Introductory Section to AFINCSs
3. First Impression 5 Questions
4. Potential Drivers 13 Questions
5. Potential Barriers 18 Questions
6. Value Perception & Future Outlook 5 Questions
7. Previous Awareness of AFINCSs 1 or 5 Questions (previous awareness No/Yes)
8. Respondent Attributes 5 Questions
Total Questions: 47 / 51Please note that only mandatory questions are listed in this overview. All open-ended 
questions were optional to answer. 
 
Figure 6. Geographic location of survey respondents. 





Figure 7. Employment by sector of survey respondents. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
3.2 Analytical framework: Innovation diffusion theory 
Innovations have attracted the interest of scholars who have researched innovative 
products, services or ideas from a diverse set of academic perspectives and across 
different disciplines (Cheng et al., 2004). An innovation can be defined as “an idea, 
practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” 
(Rogers, 2003 p. 12). Based on this simple but concise definition, and with the 
intelligence gained from the literature review, we could consider airport-led transfer 
schemes as an innovative concept emerging in the airline industry. Consequently, the 
innovation diffusion theory (IDT) was utilised to support the process of unveiling, 
ranking and assessing potential drivers and barriers for the airline adoption of AFINCSs. 
 The innovation diffusion theory has several contributors (Bass, 1969; Moore & 
Harley, 2008), but Rogers (1964, 2003) is considered as the founding father of IDT. 
According to Rogers (2003, p. 11), “diffusion is the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system”. IDT has been extensively applied in academic research (Frambach & 
Schillewaert, 2002) and has also been used in air transport related research, for instance 
by Breitenmoser et al. (2013), Galang (2012), Liang & James (2009) or Segerstedt & 
Austria 2 Germany 15 Poland 4 Turkey 2
Brazil 2 Maldives 1 Portugal 1 United Arab Emirates 1
Canada 2 Mexico 1 South Africa 1 UK & Northern Ireland 1
China 2 New Zealand 2 Spain 1 United States of America 6
Croatia 1 Panama 1 Switzerland 1 Total Respondents 47
Grote (2016). Over the decades, two major research streams emerged, one being the 
process of innovation diffusion and the other one being the characteristics of innovations 
and their impact on adoption (Kim & Ammeter, 2014). The characteristics, or to be more 
precise, the perceived characteristics of innovations, are of prime interest as they have the 
ability to either drive or impede the adoption process (Kapoor et al., 2014). Hence, in line 
with our research aim, the focus was put on perceived innovation characteristics and how 
they could act as drivers or barriers for airline adoption. 
According to Rogers (2003, p.168), “the innovation-decision process (IDP) is a 
process through which an individual (or other decision-making unit) passes from gaining 
initial knowledge of an innovation, to forming an attitude toward the innovation, to 
making a decision to adopt or reject, to implementation of the new idea, and to 
confirmation of the decision”. Based on Rogers’ IDP, an airline that is considering 
adopting an airport-led transport scheme would go through a process of up to five stages: 
knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, confirmation.  
Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) developed a multi-level framework of 
organisational innovation adoption through identifying and integrating factors that have 
been previously recognised to promote or impede organisational innovation adoption. 
Furthermore, they also incorporate to their framework elements of classical models of 
organisational buying behaviour.  The first level of their framework, that of organisational 
innovation adoption, is of prime value for our analysis. 
Two main similarities with the previously presented IDP of Rogers can be 
recognised. Firstly, Frambach and Schillewaert’s framework also presents five sequential 
stages which to the largest extent are comparable with the stages in Rogers’ IDP. 
Secondly, five of the six perceived innovation characteristics are identical to the ones 




Figure 8. Framework of organisational innovation adoption. 
Source: Authors adapted from Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) 
In contrast to Rogers’ IDP, Frambach and Schillewaert’s framework not only 
incorporates the effects that directly influence the adoption decision, for instance the 
perceived innovation characteristics, but also indirect effects, for instance the supplier 
marketing efforts. In total, Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) suggest five sets of 
determinants that influence the innovation adoption decision: the Adopter Characteristics 
(AC), the Environmental Influences (EI), the Perceived Innovation Characteristics (PIC), 




4.1 Drivers and Barriers 
Based on the literature review and interviews, a total of 17 drivers and 21 barriers with 
the potential to impact the airline adoption of AFINCSs were identified. These are 
summarised in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
 
 





Table 3. Identified drivers (I). Element Drive  Literature / 
Interview 






Lit: Maertens et al. 
(2016a) 
Int: Yes 
AFINCSs require little investment and 
limited lifecycle effort from the airline. 
Involvement is usually limited to provide the 
airport with access to the airline check-in 
system, as well as establishing a connection 
between the airport's booking platform and 

















As implementing an AFINCS requires little 
up-front investment, the scheme can be 







Lit: Fichert & 
Klopphaus  (2016) 
Int: Yes 
As implementing an AFINCS require almost 
no change to the airlines' operations, the 









Lit: Fichert & 
Klopphaus (2016)  
Int: Yes 
AFINCSs do not require the airline to alter its 












AFINCSs connect the networks of all carriers 











In an AFINCS the participating airline only 










In AFINCSs, the passengers will book 
directly with the respective airlines via the 
airports' website, through an OTA or directly 













In an AFINCS, the transfer process is 
essentially taken over by the passenger, but 
facilitated by the airport. Costs arising from 
the facilitation are not charged to the airlines 











Lit: Cserep (2016); 
Fichert & 
Klopphaus (2016);  
Harrison (2015) 
Int: Yes 
In an AFINCS itinerary the passenger has 
two separate tickets and in case of 
misconnection the airport will take care of the 
passenger handling, rebooking and absorb the 
additional costs arising. 
PIC D_10 
Table 4. Identified drivers (II). 
Element Driver Literature / 
Interview 
Description F&S  ID 










As AFINCS itineraries are booked in one 
transaction but with two separate tickets, the 
compensation liability for the airlines 














In absence of through-fares, passengers 
buying tickets for an AFINCS itinerary, 
essentially pay a sum-of-sector fare. 
Consequently, prorate dilution, which occurs 
when airlines could have earned more from 
taking two local passengers instead of one 








Passengers buying an AFINCS itinerary are 
purchasing separate tickets with each airline and 
thus the airlines are not required to settle & audit 





Impact on Accounts 
Receivable 
Turnover 
Lit: Holloway (2008) 
Int: Yes 
In an AFINCS each airline will receive its revenue 
portion at time of booking (if booked directly with 
the airline) or shortly after the booking from the 
OTA or provider of the airport's booking platform.    
PIC D_14 
Miscellaneous Participation Instead 
of Observation 
Lit: Grimme et al. 
(2016) 
Int: Yes 
The recent past has shown that several 3rd parties 
(e.g. meta-search engines or OTAs) begin to see a 
business opportunity in non-connected airline 
networks. These ventures do not require 
participation from the airlines which also means 
airlines have no control over its development and 
growth. In AFINCSs airlines at least can 
participate and somewhat shape their development.  
EI D_15 





As the business model of LCCs continue to 
converge, the once strict P2P and no partnerships 
paradigm is further diminishing.  As a result, LCCs 
but also FSNCs and Hybrids will look into 
opportunities to enhance their network connectivity 
to remain competitive. 
EI D_16 




As the concepts of self-connectivity, airport-led 
transfer schemes and AFINCSs are increasingly 
addressed at industry expert gatherings, airlines 
will become increasingly aware of such schemes.  
SN D_17 
 





Table 5. Identified barriers (I) 
Element Barrier Literature / 
Interview 








As AFINCSs are fairly new concepts, the potential benefits 
an airline can gain from participation, primarily incremental 










Airlines that join an AFINCS will automatically connect 
their network with all airlines participating at that airport. 
While one airline might complement the own network, 
another one could compete for the same traffic and thus co-








Sanchez et al. 
(2016) 
Int: Yes 
Self-diversion is the risk to divert passengers from the own 
direct or online service to itineraries involving a partner 
airline. A risk that is generally present in airline partnerships 
but much harder to manage in AFINCSs as traditional 











Lit: CAPA (2016); 
Malighetti (2016) 
Int: Yes 
Double marginalisation: Combining two separate tickets that 
are individually priced means the passenger will have to pay 
a sum-of-sectors fare. Consequently, double marginalisation 
occurs as both airlines price each segment not considering 
the overall price of the trip. This can lead to non-









Charging of Fees 
& Taxes 




Double charging of fees & taxes: Although essentially being 
a transfer passenger, any fees & taxes will be based on the 
two individual tickets. In many cases this will result in 
higher costs as certain fees & taxes are not applicable or 









Lit: Airneth (2015); 
Gunnarsson (2016); 
Maertens et al. 
(2016a) 
Int: Yes 
Passengers need to be aware that it is possible to travel on 
the demanded O&D using two airlines that do not connect 
their networks through traditional partnership agreements. 
As of May 2017, only two meta-search engines 
(skyscanner.com & dohop.com) are able to identify such 
itineraries and at the same time inform the passenger that 









Lit: Cserep (2016); 
Grimme (2011); 
Suau-Sanchez et al. 
(2016) 
Int: Yes 
Passengers need to be aware that two airlines partner via the 










GDS inclusion: AFINCS itineraries will not be identified in 










Lit: Cserep (2016) 
Int: Yes 
Airline.com inclusion:  AFINCS itineraries will not be 
identified on either of the two partnering airlines' websites 









Lit: Airneth (2015); 
Grimme et al. 
(2016); Maertens et 
al. (2016a); Suau-
Sanchez et al. 
(2016) 
Int: Yes 
Airport.com inclusions: AFINCS itineraries are bookable 
through the airport's dedicated website which is not a 











As AFINCS itineraries are not bookable on the airline's 
website, both partners are not able to offer their full 
portfolio of ancillary services, at least not at the time of 
booking. This might especially be an issue for LCCs that 












Sanchez et al. 
(2016) 
Int: Yes 
Passengers willing to book an AFINCS itinerary will in the 
majority of the cases sacrifice time, convenience and airline 
responsibility in case of misconnections in exchange for 
lower airfares. Consequently, the offering only appeals to 
price sensitive, low yield passengers.  
PIC B_13 
 
Note: Lit = Literature Review; Int = Interview; N/A = Not Available; F&S = Frambach and 
Schillewaert’s determinants. 
 
Table 6. Identified barriers (II) 
Element Barrier Literature / 
Interview 









Lit: Choi (2016);  
Fichert & Klopphaus 





Customers are used to the traditional transfer experience 
when connecting between airlines with an e.g. interline 
partnership. The offered transfer experience for AFINCS 
itineraries is less convenient and more complex which in 
















Passengers, in some cases, are required to clear immigration 
before they can re-enter airside and thus valid travel 
documents, potentially Visas, are required. Obtaining a Visa 
not only adds costs and effort, it might also be impossible 
for some passengers. 
PIC B_15 







Lit: Choi (2016) 
Int: Yes 
Although the airline is not responsible in case of 
misconnecting passengers or bags, the passenger will still 
consider all stakeholders including the airlines to be 
responsible. This will lead to additional costs & efforts in 
handling the customer complaints and potentially has a 
negative image on the airline brand. 
PIC B_16 




Although AFINCSs are not new, the more recent scheme 
introduced at London-Gatwick is still not very mature with 





Lit: Airneth (2015); 
Grimme et al. (2016); 
Maertens et al. 
(2016b); Suau-
Sanchez et al. (2016) 
Int: No 
Currently only few AFINCSs are offered but, as the airline 
industry is a network industry, the attractiveness for airlines 
as well as the passenger would be higher if other airports 
offered a similar or in fact the same scheme. A more 
widespread airport adoption would for instance overcome 
the problem of the unidirectionality of routes as passengers 








Although the topic of self-connectivity and AFINCSs is on 
the radar of some airports, airline consultants and is 
discussed at industry gatherings, it appears that not many 
airlines are aware of the concept and its underlying 
mechanisms. 
SME B_19 






GatwickConnects, currently the only visible AFINCS that 
entails an airport-airline-co-operation, was adopted by 15 
carriers. Although this is around 1/3 of all passenger airlines 
in LGW (43 scheduled passenger airlines as of May 2017) it 







Airlines that have already implemented traditional airline 
partnership mechanisms such as interline or codeshares will 
not be interested in trialing this new partnership mechanism. 
AC B_21 
 
Note: Lit = Literature Review; Int = Interview; N/A = Not Available; F&S = Frambach and 
Schillewaert’s determinants. 
 
As described in the methodological section, the just presented 38 drivers and 
barriers are the input for our survey. Since the focus of our research was put on the 
perceived innovation characteristics, the 30 drivers and barriers (12 drivers and 18 
barriers) that were considered to be perceived innovation characteristics are primarily 
discussed in this results section.3 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, only the drivers and 
barriers with a mean score > 3.8 are analysed and synthesised in greater detail.  
The survey results reveal that only 32% of the respondents have heard of 
AFINCSs prior to the survey (B_19). That value further decreases to 29% if only 
respondents working for an airline, the potential adopters, are considered. This somewhat 
questions the validity of the claim made by several stakeholders (e.g. Gunnarsson (2016) 
or Harrison (2015)) that airlines are waking up to the potential of self-connectivity and 
airport-led transfer schemes. Consequently, the currently limited knowledge about the 
                                                 
3 Note that the potential driver ‘Reduced Passenger Compensation Liability” (D_11) was not addressed in 
the survey as this topic was deemed too sensitive due to the fact that it is not yet clear how AFINCSs would 
be treated by consumer protection laws.      
existence and the functionality of such schemes including adopters (i.e. airlines) can be 
considered as a key indirect barrier in the diffusion and adoption process. Nevertheless, 
around two-thirds of all respondents stated that their reaction to AFINCSs is positive 
(21%) or slightly positive (43%). In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the 
percentage of positive reactions was higher when respondents were asked at the beginning 
of the survey (32%) than at the end (21%). This may indicate that the AFINCS concept 
is perceived less favourable after respondents have gained a better understanding of the 
various potential drivers and barriers for adoption. 
 Table 7 presents the results for the drivers. Nine of the twelve presented potential 
perceived innovation characteristic drivers received a mean score of ≥ 3.8 and thus were 
considered key drivers when it comes to adopting AFINCSs. The standard deviation 
ranged from 0.914 (D_01) to 1.356 (D_07) which shows that there was no agreement 
among the survey participants although the dispersion of answers was not extensive.  
Offering connectivity across airline business models turned out to be the strongest 
driver4 (D_06 – MS 4.23 – SD 0.994 – #1) for adopting AFINCSs which intuitively seems 
logical as interline and codeshare mechanisms do not work for and with pure P2P carriers. 
Consequently, it can be argued that AFINCSs have a relative advantage over the 
codeshare and interline mechanisms as they provide a technology and operational 
solution for an existing problem that arises from the difference in airline business models. 
The second (“No Prorate Dilution” – D_12 – MS 4.23 – SD 0.994), third (“No Interline 
Billing Audits” – D_13 – MS 4.15 – SD 1.110) and fourth (“No Impact on Accounts 
Receivable Turnover” – D_14 – MS 4.02 – SD 1.062) highest rated drivers all concern 
partnership revenue. While prorate dilution and accounts receivable turnover implications 
are aspects that are frequently brought forward as potential negative facets of traditional 
partnership mechanisms (Holloway, 2008) it is somewhat surprising that the interline 
audit billings appeared that high on the list. One potential reason for this could be its 
observability as the interline audit efforts are not only visible but also financially 
quantifiable. 
Not being responsible for the transfer process at the connect point received a mean 
score of 4.00 (D_09 – SD 1.111 – #5) while the elimination of the passenger 
misconnection risk was only rated 3.70 (D_10 – SD 1.219 – #11) and thus received the 
second lowest score. This result came as a surprise because not being exposed to the 
misconnection seems like an obvious and tangible airline benefit and was also mentioned 
multiple times during the interviews. The open comments offered some insights into what 
has likely driven this rather low rating as quite a number of respondents voiced their 
concerns that, although the misconnection risk is technically transferred from the airlines 
to the airport, the passengers will still hold the airlines responsible. While these concerns 
are valid and rational, the recent past, namely the introduction of LCCs, has shown that 
passenger expectations are perfectly manageable. Anecdotes from airline managers that 
claimed passengers will never understand why they need to pay for bags or meals should 
serve as lesson. 
The survey respondents overall tended to agree that the “Low Risk Trialability: 
Operations” (D_04 – MS 3.91 – SD 0.919 – #6) and “Low Risk Trialability: Costs” (D_03 
– MS 3.83 – SD 0.975 – #7) make AFINCSs interesting for airlines which, according to 
Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) should have a positive impact on the airlines adoption 
decision. Once more it can be argued that AFINCSs have a relative advantage over the 
                                                 
4 Note that the driver “No Prorate Dilution” (D_12) received the same mean score and also showed the 
exact same standard deviation. The reasons for placing “Connectivity Across Business Models” (D_06) on 
the first rank was that the Top 2 box rating (“Agree” & “Tend to Agree”) was with 83.0% above the “No 
Prorate Dilution” Driver (80.9%).  
codeshare and interline mechanisms that cannot be trialled by the airlines without 
incurring major costs and adding operational risks. 
Beyond the trialability, survey participants tended to agree that airlines might be 
interested in AFINCSs as the participation creates limited additional costs (D_01 – MS 
3.81 – SD 0.914 – #8). The Driver “Limited Additional Complexity” ranked last (D_02 
– MS 3.57 – SD 1.087 – #12), which seemed to have two reasons. First, similar to what 
was already mentioned for D_10, FSNCs have learned to manage the complexity of 
partnerships and thus this Driver might not be that relevant, at least for them. Second, 
several respondents feared that airports could develop their own, non-standardised 
AFINCSs which would increase the complexity for the airlines and also the passenger. 
One respondent aptly stated that “In extreme cases there will be as much airport 
facilitated schemes as there are airports”.  
The Driver “No Inter-Airline IT-System Integration Required” (D_08) came in 
ninth with a mean score of 3.81 and a standard deviation of 1.282 which indicates some 
disagreement among the respondents. The open comments revealed that several 
respondents were of the opinion that such a scheme cannot properly work without certain 
IT links being established. One respondent clearly stated that “IT systems are to be linked 
in any case” to allow passenger identification, for instance to track their true O&D. 
During the interview research this topic was also brought up by one interviewee from an 
airline participating in GatwickConnects that claimed they had neither an overview about 
how many passengers were on their flights using the scheme nor on what O&Ds 
passengers were travelling. 
 
Table 7. Ranking of drivers according to the perceived innovation characteristics (PIC) 
Rank ID Driver Underlying Statement MS Min  Max SD Mdn IQR 
1 D_06 Connectivity Across 
Business Models  
…airlines can connect with any 
carrier, regardless of their 
Business Model including LCCs. 
4.23 1 5 0.994 5 1 
2 D_12 No Prorate 
Dilution 
…airlines are not facing the risk 
of pro-rate dilution. 
4.23 2 5 0.994 5 1 
3 D_13 No Interline 
Billing Audits 
…airlines are not required to 
audit interline billings. 
4.15 1 5 1.110 5 1 
4 D_14 No Impact on 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover 
…airlines are not facing the risk 
of cash-flow delays. 
4.02 2 5 1.062 4 2 
5 D_09 No Inter-Airline 
Transfer Process 
Required 
…airlines are not responsible for 
the transfer process at the 
connect point. 
4.00 1 5 1.111 4 2 
6 D_04 Low Risk 
Trialability:  
Operations 
…participation can be trialled 
with low operational risks. 
3.91 1 5 0.919 4 1 
7 D_03 Low Risk 
Trialability: Costs  
…participation can be trialled 
with low financial risks. 
3.83 1 5 0.975 4 2 
8 D_01 Limited  
Additional Costs 
…participation creates limited 
additional costs for the airline. 
3.81 2 5 0.914 4 1 
9 D_08 No Inter-Airline 
IT System Integration 
Required 
…airlines are not required to 
connect their IT Systems. 
3.81 1 5 1.282 4 3 
10 D_07 No Inter-Airline 
Partnership 
Agreement Required 
…airlines do not need 
partnership agreements with the 
other participating airlines. 
3.77 1 5 1.356 4 2 
11 D_10 Eliminate the  
Inter-Airline 
Misconnection Risk 
…airlines are not responsible in 
case of passenger 
misconnections. 
3.70 1 5 1.219 4 2 
12 D_02 Limited Additional 
Complexity 
…participation creates limited 
additional complexity for the 
airline. 
3.57 1 5 1.087 4 1 
 
MS = Mean Score; Min = Minimum; Max = Maximum; SD = Standard Deviation; Mdn = Median; 
IQR = Interquartile Range  
 
Table 8 presents and ranks all 18 potential perceived innovation characteristic 
barriers based on the mean score of the survey participates. Results show that six of the 
18 potential barriers obtained a mean score ≥ 3.8 and thus were considered as key barriers 
when it comes to adopting an AFINCSs. 
The customer expectation in case of misconnections received with 4.09 the 
highest mean score of all presented barriers (B_16 – SD 1.028 – #1) which, as already 
discussed earlier, is rooted in the concern that passengers will expect the airlines to be 
responsible and that any potential dissatisfaction arising could have a detrimental effect 
on the airline. A few survey respondents also expressed their concerns about unclear 
liabilities concerning EC 261/20045, one even suspecting that “Consumer protective 
authorities may create barriers for the model, as misconnections would be considered to 
be liability of at least one of the transporters, not the airport”. Interestingly this 
perception is the exact opposite to what was brought forward by one interviewee who 
suggested that airlines could be interested in AFINCSs as it exempts them from any 
liability in case of misconnections and resulting delays (D_11). As mentioned earlier, this 
driver was not included in the survey because of its sensitivity but feedback shows that 
any lack of legal clarity could be in fact a barrier to adoption. 
The statement “I wonder if passengers save that much with this model” of one of 
the interviewees summarises a concern that several respondents seemed to share. The fact 
that non-competitive fares are perceived as a key barrier seems comprehensible as this 
was mentioned recurrently in the literature and multiple times during the interviews. In 
this regard, an interesting outcome of the survey is that the double charging of fees and 
taxes ranked second (B_05 – MS 4.04 – SD 0.824) while non-competitive fares due to 
sum-of-sectors fares ranked only 11th (B_04 – MS 3.51 – SD 0.920). It is beyond the 
scope of this research to analyse whether non-competitive fares, irrespective if driven by 
double marginalisation or double charging of fees and taxes, are a real or just perceived 
characteristic of AFINCSs.  
With a mean score of 3.98 (B_15 – SD 1.041) an operational driven barrier, that 
of requiring valid travel documents for the connection, ranked third and participants 
raised concerns such as “Who will check [the passengers] document at first point of 
origin?” or “Who pays for visa infringement fees?”. It is somewhat surprising that an 
operational barrier was ranked that high while others, more strategically relevant barriers, 
for instance “All or None Partnership” (B_02 – MS 3.55 – SD 1.107 – #10), were ranked 
lower. One potential reason could be the fact that 68% of the respondents heard of, and 
learned about AFINCSs through the survey and thus an operational barrier was easier to 
comprehend and to agree with.   
The survey respondents overall tended to agree that a barrier for the adoption of 
an AFINCS is the fact that connecting flights cannot be sold via the airline’s website 
(B_09 – MS 3.91 – SD 1.088 – #4). Not being able to distribute through the GDSs 
received a lower mean score (B_08 – MS 3.66 – SD 1.016 – #8) which could indicate 
that GDSs are less important for the distribution of a product that primarily attracts price 
sensitive low yield customers. For LCCs that to the largest extent refrain from selling 
through the GDSs, this barrier should be largely irrelevant. Note, however, that this 
survey was carried out before ‘Worldwide by easyJet’ was launched in September 2017. 
This scheme in fact allows direct booking of connecting flights from the easyJet’s website 
and proves that this barrier can be eliminated. Being able to sell an AFINCS ticket via the 
airline’s website not only significantly increase the marketability, at the same time it also 
helps to overcome the lack of passenger awareness of the AFINCS product that the survey 
                                                 
5 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 outlines common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in 
the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (European Parliament, 2004). 
respondents rated as fifth most relevant barrier (B_07 – MS 3.87 – SD 0.981). Creating 
the required passenger awareness is virtually impossible to achieve for the airport on its 
own simply because it would require them to advertise at all the major O&Ds that can 
potentially be connected via their airport. 
Airline partnerships in general carry the risk of self-diversion and the survey 
respondents tended to agree that this risk is a barrier when it comes to the adoption 
decision (B_03 – MS 3.83 – SD 1.154 – #6). The risk of self-diversion will however be 
different for each potential adopter largely depending on the own, and the network of the 
partners present at the airport. The size of the risk can be somewhat quantified, for 
instance by the innovator (airport) or the potential adopter (airline), through a basic O&D 
network analysis that identifies O&Ds that the airline would serve together with the 
partners but also offers on its own. Alternatively, a more sophisticated approach using a 
QSI-based model could be employed (Suau-Sanchez et al., 2016). In case an airline 
directly sells AFINCS itineraries, like easyJet through their ‘Worldwide by easyJet’ 
platform, the airline can theoretically suppress any connect itinerary that creates potential 
self-diversion. 
 
Table 8. Ranking of barriers according to the perceived innovation characteristics (PIC)  
Rank ID Barrier Underlying Statement MS Min  Max SD Mdn IQR 
1 B_16 Customer IROPS 
Expectations: 
Misconnection 
…in case of misconnections the 
passenger will still expect the 
airlines to be responsible  
4.09 2 5 1.028 4 2 
2 B_05 Offering Non- 
Competitive Fares:   
Double Charging of 
Fees & Taxes 
…double-charging of fees & 
taxes will lead to fares that are 
not competitive 
4.04 1 5 0.824 4 1 
3 B_15 Offering an Unfeasible 
Transfer Product: Valid 
Travel Documents 
…the transfer process at the 
connecting airport requires 
valid travel documents for 
immigration 
3.98 2 5 1.041 4 2 
4 B_09 Limited Distribution  
Channels: 
Airline.com 
…the connecting flights cannot 
be sold via the airline's website 
3.91 1 5 1.088 4 1 
5 B_07 Lack of Passenger  
Awareness: 
AFINCS Product 
…the passenger awareness of 
such schemes is limited 
3.87 1 5 0.981 4 2 
6 B_03 Risk of  
Self-Diversion 
…passengers might be diverted 
from the own direct or 
connecting flight (Self-
diversion) 
3.83 1 5 1.154 4 2 
7 B_01 Incremental 
Revenue Uncertainty 
…the actual revenue potential 
for the airline is not yet clear 
3.68 2 5 0.970 4 1 
8 B_08 Limited Distribution  
Channels: GDS 
…the connecting flights cannot 
be sold via the Global 
Distribution Systems (GDS) 
3.66 1 5 1.016 4 1 
9 B_06 Lack of Passenger  
Awareness: 
AFINCS O&D 
…the majority of traditional  
flight search practices will not 
identify the connecting flights 
3.55 1 5 1.007 4 1 
10 B_02 "All or None" 
Partnership 
…the airline has no choice of 
partners as they will connect 
with all carriers participating 
3.55 1 5 1.107 4 1 
11 B_04 Offering Non- 
Competitive Fares:  
Double Marginalisation 
…the sum-of-sectors fare 
offered will not be competitive 
3.51 1 5 0.920 3 1 
12 B_12 Reduced Ancillary  
Sales Opportunities 
…the indirect distribution 
limits the sale of ancillaries 
3.51 1 5 1.089 4 1 
13 B_10 Limited Distribution  
Channels: Airport.com 
…the connecting flights can 
only be sold through the 
airports booking website 
3.51 1 5 1.127 4 2 
14 B_11 Increasing  
Indirect Sales 
…selling the connecting flights 
increases indirect sales 
3.47 2 5 1.007 3 1 
15 B_17 Immature  
Concept 
…the concept is not mature 
enough 
3.40 1 5 0.816 3 1 
16 B_18 Isolated Airport 
Adoption 
…the scheme is not widely 
offered by many airports 
3.32 1 5 1.094 3 1 
17 B_13 Low Yield  
Niche Demand 
…the offer is only attractive to 
low yield price sensitive 
passengers 
3.17 1 5 1.136 3 2 
18 B_14 Offering an Unattractive 
Transfer Product 
…the transfer process at the 
connecting airport is not an 
attractive offering to the 
passenger 
2.87 1 5 1.104 3 2 
 
MS = Mean Score; Min = Minimum; Max = Maximum; SD = Standard Deviation; Mdn = Median; 
IQR = Interquartile Range  
 
 
4.2 Environmental influences and adopter characteristics. 
According to Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) the business environment of a potential 
adopter, and here mainly the competitive pressure and the amount of entities that have 
already adopted the innovation, can directly and indirectly drive or impede the innovation 
adoption decision. 
The airline industry is highly competitive and one key factor driving this is the 
ongoing expansion of LCCs. As outlined in the literature review, first LCCs have begun 
to shift away from their pure P2P based flying (Daft & Albers, 2015) and increasingly 
serve primary airports. The survey respondents tended to agree with the statement 
“AFINCSs could become increasingly attractive for airlines as LCCs are opening up to 
the idea of inter-airline network connectivity” (D_16 – MS 3.96 – SD 1.110) which 
indicates that the concept of AFINCSs is perceived as a potential mechanism to remain 
competitive in a market where inter-airline network connectivity is no longer an exclusive 
feature of hybrids and FSNCs. Competitive pressure does not necessarily have to be 
exercised from direct competitors but could also originate from other stakeholders in the 
air transport value chain. In case of non-connected airline networks this is already 
observable as first companies, for instance kiwi.com or dohop.com, have created products 
that exploit the revenue potential arising from non-connected airline networks. The 
survey respondents however did not feel that such a development increases the airlines 
interest in AFINCSs as the statement “Otherwise 3rd parties may develop their own 
business models exploiting non-connected airline networks” received the lowest mean 
score of all potential drivers presented (D_15 – MS 3.51 – SD 1.069).  
 The size, organisational structure and innovativeness of a potential adopter can 
also influence the adoption decision. While some of the survey findings do not directly 
relate to these determinants, they do concern the adopter characteristics. With a mean 
score of 4.11 (D_05 – SD 1.015), the survey respondents tended to agree that AFINCSs 
are attractive for current P2P carriers as they can maintain their business model. Some 
literature concerning AFINCSs also hypothesises (e.g. Suau-Sanchez et al., 2016) that the 
schemes could be a key enabler for long-haul LCC services which would make carriers 
offering, or planning to offer those services, potential adopters. Among the survey 
respondents the statement “AFINCSs could be a key enabler for long-haul LCCs services” 
received a mean score of 3.57 (SD 1.162) which shows a rather low level of agreement 
with the statement. Whether or not this is rooted in the AFINCS concept or because 
respondents do not believe in the viability of long-haul LCC services cannot be answered 
from the survey findings. 
The survey respondents somewhat tended to agree that AFINCSs are not attractive 
for carriers that have already implemented partnerships based on traditional mechanisms 
(B_21 – MS 3.72 – SD 1.215) and tended to disagree with the statement “AFINCSs could 
replace traditional partnership mechanisms such as interline and codeshare” (MS 2.11 
– SD 1.189). While this finding might not be surprising, it is worthwhile to note that 11 
of the 15 carriers participating in GatwickConnects 6  have traditional partnership 
agreements ranging from basic interline up to joint venture agreements. Also, the standard 
deviation of 1.215 (B_21) indicates some level of disagreement among the respondents 
and the open comments suggest that several of them considered AFINCSs worthwhile 
also for FSNCs, for instance to participate in traffic flows they otherwise could not be 
part of, to offer connectivity at smaller spokes with limited potential partners or in general 
to connect their networks with those of the LCCs. A potential explanation why 
respondents felt that AFINCSs are mainly attractive for current P2P carriers and not that 
attractive for carriers that have already implemented partnerships based on traditional 
mechanisms can be derived from Figure 9.7 The highest concentration of dots (marked in 
green) reveals that about one-third of all respondents (17) expect AFINCSs to be less 
complex than partnerships based on traditional basic interline agreements but then also 
expect them to yield less economic benefit. This could indicate that AFINCSs are mainly 
perceived as a complementing partnership mechanism attractive for carriers that are not 
willing to add the complexity of traditional partnerships mechanisms but then are still 
interested in generating some, albeit limited, additional economic benefit. 
 
 
Figure 9. Benefit-complexity perception of AFINCS based on survey answers. Green dots: 
AFINCSs perceived less complex than interline partnerships but also less economic benefit.  
Source: Adapted from Seabury (2015). Results from the survey research. 
  
                                                 
6 The number of carriers indicated corresponds to the moment when the analysis and survey were carried 
out (March-April 2017). 
7 Survey respondents were asked to directly point their benefit-complexity perception by clicking in the 
graph. The dot could be placed anywhere within the light-blue box in the graph. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has unveiled, ranked and assessed various potential drivers and barriers 
impacting the airline adoption of AFINCSs. Of the initial 38 drivers and barriers that were 
unveiled during the first research phase, 37 were included in the survey research with 30 
of them relating to the perceived innovation characteristics of AFINCSs. The survey 
results revealed that 15 of the 30 were key drivers and barriers as the respondents’ 
answers resulted in a MS of ≥ 3.8. The remaining seven drivers and barriers concerned 
the other four sets of determinants of Frambach and Schillewaert’s (2002) framework and 
five of them emerged as key drivers or barrier. Beyond those, three additional drivers 
emerged from the survey research as they were brought up by several respondents in the 




Figure 10. Key drivers and barriers for the adoption of AFINCSs. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Our findings can be synthesised in three key aspects, namely limited awareness, 
divergent attitudes and the schemes obsolesce risk. This paper has illustrated that 
AFINCSs, although not entirely new, are still only at the onset of their potential diffusion. 
The 47 survey participants, all airline industry professionals with substantial airline 
partnership expertise, had mostly limited to no awareness of the AFINCS concept, its 
underlying mechanisms or which airlines have adopted such schemes. Awareness, as 
outlined in Frambach and Schillewaert’s framework, is the critical first step in the 
organisational innovation adoption process. 
The second main research finding with strategic relevance for the diffusion and 
airline adoption of AFINCSs is the survey participants’ divergent attitudes towards the 
concept. Two-third of the survey participants stated a positive reaction towards AFINCSs 
and whilst holistically analysing and synthesising the research findings it became 
apparent that diverging perceptions primarily regarding the schemes’ practicability, 
viability and economic benefit prevailed. The open comments captured through the 
survey research indicate that several reasons, including partial knowledge about the 
AFINCS concept, path dependency or personal innovativeness, were contributing factors 
to the divergent attitudes. However, it is primarily the characteristics of the innovation 
and how these are perceived by the potential adopters that drives a favourable or 
unfavourable attitude towards an innovation. Based on the collective findings, the six 
determinants of perceived innovation characteristics were revised and summarised in 
Table 10. In light of the conclusions brought forward in Table 10, the divergent attitudes 
towards the AFINCS innovation seem comprehensible as key determinants that have a 
positive relationship towards the innovation adoption decision, trialability being the only 
exception, were not consistently recognised by the survey participants.  
 
Table 10. Revised perceived innovation characteristics (PIC) of AFINCSs. 
Determinants Conclusion Explanation 
Relative 
advantage 
Limited Presence AFINCSs were perceived as complementing partnership mechanism that might be 
adopted in specific markets (e.g. at small spokes with limited partners) or by current 
point-to-point carriers. The concept however was not perceived as superior to the legacy 
partnership mechanisms.   
Compatibility Limited Presence Divergent opinions prevailed on whether the LCC business model is compatible with 
network connectivity and also if LCCs require such connectivity. Overall, the research 
findings indicated that connectivity should be under the sovereignty of the airline and not 
the airport.  
Complexity Limited Presence A surprising finding. "Participation creates limited additional complexity for the airline" 
emerged as the lowest ranked driver. Concerns were raised that various airports could 
develop non-standardised schemes driving complexity for airlines and passengers.  
Triability Present AFINCSs can be trialled due to the limited operational risks and limited costs involved. 
Business model continuity for current P2P carriers such as LCCs could also encourage 
experimenting with the AFINCS concept.   
Observability Absent Low awareness of the concept while results of AFINCSs are only visible to the adopting 
airline (if reported by the airport). No empirical evidence exits about how beneficial 
these schemes are for the airlines as none of the adopters has made any public claims or 
statements.  
Uncertainty Limited Presence As the adoption costs of an AFINCS are limited, no uncertainty concerning the financial 
ROI emerged. However, a high uncertainty concerning passenger expectation in case of 
misconnections and the competitiveness of sum-of-sectors fares prevailed.   
 
The third finding is related to the obsolescence risk of AFINCSs. An innovation 
can only add value to an airline if it solves a major problem. In relation to our results, a 
fundamental question arises regarding the possibility that new technology and ongoing 
airline business models convergence could be diminishing the capacity of AFINCSs to 
provide a solution to those carriers that wish to transfer passengers. In this regard, the 
technological advancement in the airline industry, especially when it comes to 
distribution capabilities, must not be ignored in the context of AFINCSs and was also 
brought up in the survey responses. Some participants stated that legacy technology 
problems that prevent partnerships across business models could soon be overcome with 
emerging technology solutions such as the New Distribution Capability (NDC) 
technology that will enable the travel industry to transform the way air products are 
retailed by addressing the industry’s current distribution limitations, i.e., product 
differentiation and time-to-market, access to full and rich air content and ultimately 
provide a transparent shopping experience.8 
Our results also suggest some avenues for future research. First, while this paper 
focused on the perspective of potential adopters, future contributions could focus on 
unveiling, ranking and assessing the actual drivers and barriers of AFINCS adopters, for 
instance the carriers participating in GatwickConnects or ‘Worldwide by easyJet’. Second, 
and in relation to the obsolescence risk of the AFINCS concept, future research could 
look further into the impact of technological advancement and airline business models 
convergence, which ultimately could make the AFINCS concept obsolete. Another 
avenue for future research could focus on the competitiveness of ticket fares in AFINCSs. 
                                                 
8 See IATA’s NDC Program for more information: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/airlinedistribution /ndc/ 
Pages/default.aspx  
The sum-of-sectors fare price setting mechanism, as well as the double charging of fees 
and taxes could potentially generate non-competitive air fares. This is a concern that was 
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